Tonight the "Great Books" discussion is to be on the play, or dramatic poem, Nathan der Weise by G.E. Lessing. As I was unfamiliar with this work, I borrowed a copy from the St. Norbert College library and with it a copy of a scholarly review of literary criticism of the work over the centuries. (Nathan the Wise was written in 1779 and the review includes criticism up to 1991.)
There was much divergence of opinion among the critics both as to whether the poem has any significant literary value and, if it does, for what reasons. The one thing all critics were able to agree on was that when they review a work it "means what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less".
All the king's horses probably can't put Lessing's play back together after this history of scholarly attention.
That scholars can't even begin to agree about the meaning, literary qualities, or social value of the work is intriguing. Why can't they agree? Why do they feel compelled to comment? If the poem is so obscure (or so poorly written) as to communicate nothing in particular, why is it worth so much scholarly attention? On the other hand, if Nathan the Wise is a great literary work, how could it be so frequently and so wildly misunderstood?
For the critics have variously held that the play is a call for the emancipation of the Jews in Europe and a justification of their continued repression; a manifesto for Deism, an appeal to atheism, and a celebration of Protestantism; a prequel to Marxist classism; and an argument for civil tolerance -- among other possible interpretations. Those who have held these views have argued further about whether the play is a masterpiece of German literature, a flawed but perhaps excusable effort, or incompetent drivel. It seems implausible that all these interpretations can be correct.
The critical opinion which most discomforted me was that of the National Socialist critics, the Nazis. (Nearly everything I know about the Nazis discomforts me.) According to the scholarly review, the Nazi interpreters argued, with a variety of nuances, that Lessing certainly would have been anti-Semitic had he lived 150 years later. Perhaps, some said, he had been willing to tolerate the elite among the Jews (Moses Mendelssohn was Lessing's friend), but Lessing had not intended this tolerance to be applied to the poor and common Jews. Or perhaps he simply did not recognize, at that early time, the full extent of Jewish meanness and hypocrisy; he had been deceived, his good character played upon. Some Nazis explained (in the very epitome of hypocrisy) that later Jews had promulgated a false interpretation of the play, and at least one concluded (apparently irrelevantly) that Lessing's family and then Lessing himself had been murdered by Jews -- a Big Lie accusing others of creating a Big Lie. The entire interpretation by the Nazi critics is not merely wrong, not simply false, it is preposterous. And irrefutable.
The technique of arguing what Lessing would have been was in no way limited to the egregious claims of the Nazis. Many other critics, far less evil but equally preposterous, also claimed that had Lessing been alive in their day, then certainly he would have been thinking as they thought. Such an argument is preposterous on its face; it is intrisically speculative and entirely untestable, and in any case is irrelevant to understanding an author who, in fact, was not alive in their time.
In the particular politic tumult of this season -- it does not matter very much in which political season I am writing -- the question which keeps recurring to my mind is how one can refute a preposterous argument.
Nathan the Wise actually lampoons the supercilious reasoning of those in power and pleads for, if not complete tolerance, at least some humility in our judgements, which are so easily and so often mistaken. (You can trust my interpretation; I am not misled by my prejudices in the way that every preceeding critic appears to have been.)
To offer such an interpretation is to invite the counterclaim that of course I have been misled by my prejudices; after all, it could be easily shown that I have previously argued for tolerance and humility, and against blind acceptance of any reasoning which plays directly into the hands of power. (One need only read the rest of my comments on actual reality.) Why should my established position be given special preference in comparison to my opponent's established position? And is this not especially true in a case where anyone -- that is, anyone who already shares my opponent's bias -- will easily, and without recourse to complex rational argument, see that it is my opponent's position which more closely aligns with their own pre-established point of view?
I realize that this is a circular argument; my point is that it is not possible to get to the root of a circular argument in order to refute it. One would have to attack it in toto which becomes harder to do as the argument is built up of more and more utterly preposterous assertions.
That Nathan the Wise could be, and in actual reality was used to support the Nazis, the Communists, the Jews, the Protestants is a warning to all players of the actual reality game.