1/9/2009 8:11

Relative Moral Values

Years ago when I was living in Madison, a graduate student at the university took on a project to break the wings of ducks along Monroe Street. I hardly need to mention that there was something of a public outcry.

What surprised me at the time and continues to puzzle me today is that the student and his advisor apparently did not understand why quantification of mortality would not automatically trump all other esthetic and moral interests. The advisor was interviewed and argued that the actual mortality impact of flight disability was a quantity not yet known to science. Why would he suppose that this fact would be considered justification for maiming and endangering living beings?

Especially for living being enjoyed by a large population of politically savvy professional families?

In recent years, there have been continuing reports of animal rights extremists shooting at researchers and firebombing their family homes. These extremists declare that the scientists actually are animal murderers because they perform research on animals (although in some cases the activists are reported to be mistaken in their accusations). Why would these extremists suppose that research on animals, even if unjustified and inhumane, could in any way justify the murder of human beings and endangerment of their offspring?

One has to question whether either group of actors has the intellectual breadth to be considered fully competent to function in human society. But these people are not isolated loners holding no conversation with others. How is it that they were never brought up short by the opinions of other human beings that there may be other considerations? Have the rest of us failed to state the additional criteria?